

SCP V-23-04-70

SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

12 FEBRUARY 1970

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
12 FEBRUARY 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 4)

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW SCORES POLICY OF MAINTAINING U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE

The current debate in the United States on the matter of U.S. force levels in Europe has been duly noted by Soviet propagandists. But they see the Nixon Administration as maintaining current force levels despite Senator Mansfield's pending resolution--cosigned by a majority of the Senate--which urges the withdrawal of a "substantial number" of U.S. troops now stationed in Europe, and they view Administration policy in this regard as being aimed at forestalling progress on European security. Comment at the time of Prime Minister Wilson's 26-28 January visit to the United States took note of reported assurances by President Nixon that Washington would maintain current force levels at least until 1971. These assurances, in the words of PRAVDA's London correspondent Orestov on 31 January, serve to demonstrate that the United States has not changed its stand on European security.

Under Secretary of State Richardson's 20 January speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations also comes under fire. A participant in Moscow radio's domestic service roundtable show on 25 January says that Richardson indicated that despite congressional pressure, the Administration opposes any unilateral troop reduction. The commentator calls Richardson's statement symptomatic of the general line of U.S. foreign policy and concludes that it is directly related to the alleged U.S. effort to delay the calling of a conference on European security. Attacking U.S. reservations regarding a conference, the same commentator goes on to say that Washington has insisted that a conference must be preceded by agreement on the part of the socialist states to discuss the question of the mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. A later article in NEW TIMES, reviewed by TASS on 11 February, also touches on the matter of balanced force reductions. The article says that placing the issue on the agenda of a European security conference could lead to "endless discussions" and "doom" the conference in advance.*

* While Soviet propaganda at the time of the early-December NATO Ministerial Council session in Brussels had complained of efforts to place balanced force reduction on the agenda of a European security conference, over the past two months it has avoided specific references to force reduction, complaining only of the tactics of those who would burden the agenda "with questions which it would be unable to solve."

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The matter of a balanced force reduction is not broached in available press treatment of the Richardson speech. The most authoritative comment is a 29 January PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy, who characterizes the speech as an "attack" against the Mansfield resolution and who rejects the New York TIMES' editorial defense of the Administration policy. Mayevskiy assails the TIMES' contention that the U.S. military presence is a restraining influence on West German militarization, that it encourages Bonn to improve its relations with Eastern Europe, and that it creates an opportunity for laying a foundation for a European settlement. On the contrary, Mayevskiy says, "the presence of U.S. troops, the U.S. military bases on European territory, and the entire NATO system, directed against the socialist countries and the progressive movement in Western Europe, have been and remain factors splitting the continent, maintaining tension, and undermining European security." A later article in PRAVDA--by Orekhov on 6 February--says that Richardson, in rejecting any idea of a possible reduction of U.S. troop strength in Europe, "proclaimed a course not of relaxing but of maintaining tension in Europe."

"VIETNAMIZATION" IN EUROPE

While pointing up the U.S. intent to continue its military presence in Europe, Soviet commentators at the same time warn that the Administration seeks to place a greater defense burden on its allies, a tack which they view as the "Vietnamization" of Europe. Thus, participants in a 1 February domestic service roundtable show, taking note of the Richardson speech, conclude that the West Europeans will be asked to contribute more troops and to pay a larger portion of U.S. troop maintenance costs. In the words of one of the show's commentators, IZVESTIYA observer Osipov, this is in effect "an attempt to 'Vietnamize' West Europe." The same Osipov repeats the "Vietnamization" thesis in an article in the 1 February issue of the IZVESTIYA supplement NEDELYA. In essence, he says, the plan is to make the West European members of NATO "intensify with their own hands the military and political barriers dividing our continent in order . . . to make the paths toward pan-European cooperation as impassable as possible." As he had done in the roundtable show, Osipov takes note of Senator Percy's remarks on 24 January at a German-American conference in Bonn that the Nixon Administration was supporting a plan to transfer the cost of U.S. troop maintenance to "the shoulders of its European NATO allies."

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LATIN AMERICA

CUBA CAUTIOUS WITH LATIN AMERICAN BIDS TO RENEW RELATIONS

Havana has reacted cautiously to a spate of recent statements by Latin American leaders raising the possibility of Cuba's reincorporation into the inter-American system. These included the 3 February statements by Venezuelan President Caldera and Trinidad-Tobago Prime Minister Williams at the eighth special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) in Caracas: They suggested that a resumption of economic relations with Cuba might be in order. While PRENSA LATINA tersely reported these statements, Havana comment on the IA-ECOSOC meeting ignored the question of a Cuban-Latin American rapprochement, focusing virtually exclusively on irreconcilable "contradictions" between the United States and Latin America that allegedly surfaced at the conclave. However, beginning on the 7th--the date the Caracas meeting closed--Cuban media in reporting both positive and negative Latin American reaction to the Caldera and Williams' initiatives carried a statement of Cuban conditions for a resumption of ties.

The present formulation by Havana media of the conditions for renewed ties appears to be intentionally more vague than the specific conditions outlined by Castro in a 14 July 1969 speech.* Then Castro stipulated that Latin American countries desiring relations with Cuba "must begin by saying that the OAS agreements [on Cuba] were arbitrary and unjust and that . . . as a correction to the crime committed against our fatherland, the complicity maintained with the Yankee imperialists, they are prepared to denounce these agreements." In contrast, Radio Havana concluded its 8 February report of a statement by the Argentine Foreign Minister that opposed Cuban reentry into the OAS until Cuba "changes its hostile attitude toward the American countries" with the following comment:

The Cuban Revolutionary Government has repeatedly stated that, before it could consider the possibility

* For an analysis of Castro's 14 July remarks and background on Cuba's position with regard to renewed relations with Latin America and with the United States, see the FBIS SURVEY of 17 July 1969, pages 8-11. Castro's 14 July conditions for resumption of relations were reiterated in an 8 October speech to the UN General Assembly by Cuban delegate Ricardo Alarcon.

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of resuming relations with a Latin American nation, changes would have to take place in the governments which wish to establish such relations, not in Cuba. The Cuban Revolutionary Government has also repeated that relations could be established only with those governments that do not subordinate their sovereignty to North American dictates.

This formulation is a practically verbatim repeat of a statement made last April by Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez while attending a Lima conference of the Economic Commission for Latin America.* Although subject to a variety of interpretations, this recent formulation--in contrast to Castro's demand for a public repudiation of OAS sanctions against Cuba--could be construed to mean that an expression of willingness to establish relations with Cuba is in itself a sign of the required "changes" within the Latin American governments and of their abandonment of "North American" tutelage. There is, in any case, little doubt that the Peruvian military regime meets these requirements, as Castro has hailed the measures it has instituted as genuinely "revolutionary," and in his 14 July speech intimated his interest in establishing relations with it. Although Cuban media have not themselves invoked the prerequisite of public repudiation of OAS sanctions, a 6 February PRENSA LATINA dispatch summarized an article from the Chilean CP organ EL SIGLO which vowed that Latin American states "will have to admit their mistake [in obeying OAS anti-Cuba resolutions] and resume the relations which they broke off unilaterally."

Havana Sensitive to Charges It Reneged on Revolutionaries

A factor that might inhibit Havana in seeking reestablishment of bilateral ties with Latin American states is that it would leave her vulnerable to charges of betraying the cause of continental revolution, a charge which Castro used to level repeatedly at Moscow and its allies in the course of denouncing their economic and political overtures to Latin American "oligarchies" which repressed domestic revolutionaries. There are signs Havana itself may already be on the defensive in its relations with Latin American revolutionaries, a situation which would only be

* This statement is carried in the FBIS SURVEY of 8 May 1969, page 5. At the Lima meeting Rodriguez issued the first statement by a Cuban leader backing the Peruvian regime.

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exacerbated if it reestablished relations with Latin American states which continue to keep former guerrillas in jail or press anti-guerrilla campaigns. While recent reports from Venezuela and Colombia--unacknowledged by Cuban media--quote guerrillas in those countries as complaining that Cuba has either terminated or greatly reduced its aid to them, Havana has shown sensitivity to suggestions that her support for guerrilla warfare may be flagging.

This sensitivity was shown on 4 February, when PRENSA LATINA released a communique issued by the Cuban Union of Young Communists-Federation of University Students (UJC-FEU) rebutting an article in the Chilean EL SIGLO on 28 January. Written by Eduardo Labarca, and based on statements by a Chilean CP Youth leader who had attended a Havana consultative meeting of the Cuban-led Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), it quoted comments allegedly made by Castro in a 5 January meeting with the student leaders. Castro's remarks seemed atypically to endorse the Chilean party's commitment to peaceful politicking while at the same time denouncing Latin American ultra-leftist elements the Cubans had once supported. Castro was said to have called Chile and Uruguay "institutional oases" which the United States would find difficult to dominate, lauded the Chilean "mass movement," and criticized Latin American guerrillas as follows:

In general, guerrilla movements in Latin America have done everything contrary to what they should have done Some ultra-radicals who were ready to conquer the world arrived in Cuba They soon proved to be all talk and some of them showed they were working in favor of the enemy, in favor of imperialism We have experienced many disappointments. We have risked much, too much, even for people who have proven not to be worth anything. We have even risked the prestige of the Cuban revolution.

In addition, Labarca quoted Cuban CP Central Committee member Faustino Perez as questioning the efficacy of robbing banks and other businesses to acquire funds, a tactic used by the Chilean Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), a Cuban-oriented group at loggerheads with the Chilean CP. The UJC-FEU reply to Labarca defensively asserted that Cuba's "forthright policy and theoretical positions . . . regarding movements which are truly confronting Yankee imperialism are backed by solid, consistent practice." Charging that "the essence" of Castro's words had been "distorted"

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by Labarca in an article which smacks "of the intrigues and falsehoods used by the Yankee Central Intelligence Agency media to try and confuse the public," the statement denigrated those who, "not daring to attack [the Cuban revolution] directly, choose to place themselves under the shadow of [its] prestige in order to subtly use pseudorevolutionary stands." It noted that the OCLAE consultative meeting "was guided by the permanent memory of Major Ernesto Che Guevara and the thinking of guerrilla priest Camilo Torres," and that one of its "greatest concerns" was for its "strategic line" of armed struggle. PRENSA LATINA on the 6th summarized a reply in EL SIGLO by Labarca in which he deplored "deeply that the article could have given rise to any misunderstanding among Cuban comrades."

Three Regimes Denounced for False Revolutionary Images

While spokesman of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru have evinced the greatest interest among Latin American governments in resuming relations with Cuba, the kind of opposition this action might engender among Latin American guerrilla leaders may have been indicated in a communique issued by Chato Peredo, self-proclaimed successor to his fallen brother 'Inti' as commander of the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), the guerrilla organization founded by Che Guevara. Summarized by PRENSA LATINA on the 10th, the communique denounces all three regimes for their fraudulent cultivation of revolutionary images. Chastizing the "self-styled revolutionary" Bolivian government as one that "jails, kills, and represses the important and self-denying revolutionaries," Peredo stated:

This "revolutionary," "anti-imperialist," and "moralizing" government is trying to make a revolution by merely ousting a company that was worn out, discredited, and hated by many peoples of the world, and on the other hand flirting behind the people's back with lesser-known and therefore less-discredited monopolies than Gulf--as if it made any difference whether it is Gulf or any other company that seeks easy ways to invest capital with the same dismal results for the people. The same process of the much vaunted "Peruvian revolution" keeps such revolutionary combatants as Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar, and many others in prison. This is similar to the famous Chilean "revolution in freedom."

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All of this, he concluded, was part of a new U.S. Latin American policy whereby "imperialism continues to exploit and suck our wealth" but uses the new tactic of extending "invigorated tentacles behind the screen of 'revolution.'" Earlier Peredo, in an interview with the Leftist Uruguayan weekly MARCHA--transmitted by PRENSA LATINA's correspondent in Montevideo to his Havana office but apparently not carried by Cuban media--denied the "possibility" of an "early" resumption of Cuban-Bolivian diplomatic relations. He was more circumspect with regard to the question of trade relations, noting that the ELN would follow "an independent policy" on the matter but that it lacked "enough information to make a definitive statement."

Peruvian Regime Given Most Favorable Cuban Reception

Of the three regimes, Cuba continues to take the most favorable view of the Peruvian, with recent Havana comment on the new Peruvian press law--widely criticized elsewhere in Latin America--praising it for restricting "oligarchical" control of a press subservient to the "Yankee imperialists." Although criticism occasionally has crept into Havana comment in connection with Peru's signing a contract with the U.S.-owned Southern Peru Copper Company, Peru remains the only Latin American government consistently lauded by Havana media.

Cuban comment has been far more equivocal on the Bolivian regime of President Ovando--which Castro on 30 September accused of "opportunism and demagoguery" and contrasted with the Peruvian regime, which Castro said was making a "genuine" effort to promote radical changes. Typically, a Radio Havana commentary on 23 January observed that Ovando had adopted "an ambiguous position" by proclaiming his government to be nationalistic "and even . . . anti-imperialistic" while at the same time keeping Regis Debray in prison and keeping in asylum in the Mexican embassy Antonio Arguedas, the former minister who transmitted Guevara's battle diary to Havana. Cuban media apparently ignored an Ovando interview appearing in the 19 December MARCHA in which he indicated receptivity to forming an anti-imperialist bloc with Cuba and Peru--a view later disavowed by an official Bolivian spokesman--and expressed interest in selling Bolivian oil to Cuba.

While Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes has been actively seeking a rapprochement with Cuba, Havana has generally refrained from discussing his initiatives. In a 29 January press conference

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Valdes correctly observed that Cuba had shown no interest in rejoining the OAS, but he advocated convocation of an OAS meeting to rescind the 1964 ban on relations with Cuba imposed by the organization. REUTERS on 9 February reported an interview in EL SIGLO with former Chilean Senator Baltasar Castro, who for a long time has been an exponent of renewed relations and who had just returned from Havana and Lima. The Chilean alleged that Castro had received Valdes' remarks with great interest: "We read these statements together with Prime Minister Castro, and the impression was pretty good, because the statements are very clear." He intimated that Peru's General Velasco had indicated he would support Chilean efforts for a rapprochement with Cuba and reported that in July the first Cuban ship to visit Chile since the break in relations would bring sugar and return with wine and other Chilean products. Last August two Chilean business representatives went to Cuba to explore the possibility of trade exchanges. While the mission was reported by Cuban media, no mention was made of the trip's outcome.

Moscow Approves Initiatives for Rapprochement

Not surprisingly, limited Moscow comment lauds recent Latin American proposals to normalize relations with Cuba. Among benefits the USSR might derive from a restoration of ties are a lessening of Cuban dependence on Soviet economic assistance, a permanent reduction of Cuba's commitment to continental armed revolutionary struggle and an abandonment of the ideological heresies associated with this commitment, and the promotion of an anti-U.S. bloc of Latin American nations. The latter consideration has been highlighted in Moscow comment so far. Thus, a 2 February PRAVDA article by Valentin Kucherov praising Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes' advocacy of renewed relations with Cuba described "the trend toward" renewed relations as "a logical manifestation of the Latin American countries' desire to pursue an independent foreign policy." Pointing out the great importance to Latin America of Cuba as an opponent of the hegemony of "American monopolies" and U.S. "aggressive, imperialist policies," Kucherov highlighted the necessity for "unity of action of the Latin American states on an anti-imperialist basis." In a similar vein, a NEW TIMES article on the IA-ECOSOC meeting, reviewed by Radio Moscow on the 9th, argued that the mere fact the conclave discussed relations with Cuba and expanded economic links with socialist countries in general was proof that Latin America's "resistance . . . to Washington's economic and political diktat is rising steadily and irrepressibly."

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An indication of past Cuban resistance to Soviet pressures to take the initiative in normalizing relations could be inferred from the 10 June 1969 address of Cuban observer Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to the Moscow international party conference. Rodriguez warned that "the establishing and broadening of diplomatic relations with the socialist countries and the announcement of possible changes of their attitude toward Cuba" on the part of Latin American regimes does not necessarily signify "a serious policy of resistance to U.S. imperialism," but is "very often" only a tactic "aimed at gaining time in the face of difficulties and at deceiving and diverting the masses."

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOUTH VIETNAM: CP REVIEWS TASKS, CITES "RESOLUTION 9"

Recent Liberation Radio broadcasts have been notable not only for explicitly discussing the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the communist party in the South, but for discussing "revolution 9" and identifying it as a resolution of the PRP Central Committee.* The PRP, established on 1 January 1962, received fairly frequent publicity in the 1964-65 period but after 1966 references to it virtually disappeared. With the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South in June 1969 there was some attention to the party and some officials. There was further mention of it last September in connection with the activities surrounding Ho Chi Minh's death.

The unprecedented propaganda references to resolution 9 come in an editorial in the January issue of the PRP journal TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD), broadcast by Liberation Radio on 31 January, and in a PRP Central Committee letter on the occasion of Tet addressed to "all party and youth group members" in South Vietnam. (The Front radio on 22-24 January had broadcast a three-installment article from TIEN PHONG "No. 8.") Both the editorial and the letter routinely claim victories over the allies, but they are notable for the detail in outlining tasks and in acknowledging shortcomings.

TIEN PHONG ON INDOCTRINATION DRIVE

The January TIEN PHONG editorial is fairly routine in its assessment of general developments in 1969 and the prospects for defeat of the U.S. Vietnamization plan in 1970. It is notable for its discussion of party guidance and the explicit instructions to cadres in the South on carrying out the current political-indoctrination drive.

The editorial notes that all communist echelons recently completed an indoctrination campaign to study the party's resolution 9 and Ho Chi Minh's testament. While claiming success in its implementation,

* Resolution 9, which was issued after the July 1969 ninth conference of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)--the Vietnam Communist Party's central directorate in the South, was captured by allied units in South Vietnam in early October 1969 and formally released to the public some two months later by the GVN and the United States. The resolution, classified "top secret" by the communists, is a lengthy report assessing the 1969-70 situation and offering general policy guidance.

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the editorial also rationalizes current difficulties and hardships in the conflict as developmental ones, experienced at a time when "we are in a position of actively attacking the enemy." It adds that if "all our party members and cadres working and fighting at all echelons and in all areas clearly realize the situation, seeing our great victories and the enemy's new defeats and weaknesses, firmly seize the present unprecedentedly favorable opportunity, and with high determination and effort implement at all costs their sacred oath to President Ho when he departed from us forever, we will certainly win even more glorious victories in the days ahead."

In claiming that echelons have been strengthened in their "proletarian" stand and outlook in the recent study drive, the editorial notes that they have devised "initial concrete plans" to be carried out. It reveals specific shortcomings in offering guidance on four main points to which "further attention" must be paid. These are:

- (1) The necessity of grasping the "basic content" of the period of general offensive and concerted uprisings when "we have developed our offensive strategy to the highest point in a comprehensive, successive, and vigorous manner in order to gradually advance toward a decisive victory." Observing that the enemy must be attacked more "vigorously and relentlessly to prevent his recovering strength, the editorial calls for new progress "in changing the balance of forces between us and the enemy." And it calls erroneous and dangerous "all passive and rightist thoughts" and hopes for a U.S. withdrawal and a deterioration in the enemy potential.
- (2) The raising by "all" echelons of the level of guidance and organization among "all cadres and party members," since the success or failure of a "correct policy" is determined by the manner in which it is implemented. At a time when the enemy is on the path of "serious collapse," the editorial says, "we have put forward very accurate trends, tasks, and working policies." And it adds that "the present urgent problem is that echelons must . . . implement, in one way or another, all resolutions and concrete plans rapidly and urgently."
- (3) The necessity of fully developing the "successes of the recent political indoctrination on the 9th resolution" popularizing the experiences of those localities where the drive was successful while "resolutely" conducting another indoctrination drive "wherever it has proved unsuccessful." The effects of a successful drive in party units are to be felt in other tasks, "especially mass motivation," the editorial notes. It adds that "it must be realized" that this is the last but very important link in transforming the party's policy, line, determination, and strategy into material strength with which to defeat the enemy.

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(4) Paying greater attention to building up "material bases" so as to make our forces stronger than the enemy's in the military and economic, as well as the political fields. The editorial says that "as followers of dialectical materialism, we highly evaluate the political and moral factors," but, it adds, "we must not in the least overlook the problem of material bases" and "we must urgently, daringly, and steadily build and develop our revolutionary forces in all fields."

TIEN PHONG concludes with the claim that the resistance has entered a "decisive phase," with 1970 offering an "extremely beautiful outlook." While more hardships and difficulties will still be experienced, it says, the southern armed forces and people "are now concentrating all their material and spiritual strength to deal a decisive blow at the enemy, to change the war situation, and to win final victory." It also adds--in a paraphrase of a passage from the COSVN 9th resolution--that "whether we can gain final victory rapidly or slowly depends on the subjective efforts of each of us."

PRP CENTRAL COMMITTEE LETTER

In the 6 February broadcast of the PRP Central Committee letter, sent to all members on the occasion of the lunar new year, the announcer describes it as "important." From its content it could be a companion piece for the TIEN PHONG editorial, but there is no indication that it was published in the journal or other organs, although it is known to have been carried in two Liberation Radio broadcasts on the 6th.

The letter, like the TIEN PHONG editorial, notes that party and youth group members had recently studied what it describes as the "PRP Central Committee" Resolution 9.* It says there was "unanimous agreement" with the resolution and that its study "initially" led to a "new change in ideological consciousness"--a development which the PRP Central Committee welcomes. Nevertheless it is still necessary, the letter adds, to continue to instill a higher determination in party chapters in various areas and among the armed forces and masses "in order to meet the requirements of the forthcoming tasks."

* This suggests that the PRP Central Committee is synonymous with the Central Office or COSVN, the identification on the captured version of resolution 9.

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The letter claims that the situation in 1969 developed "strictly in line with the party Central Committee's resolution" and argues that last year's successes, won with difficulty and a maturity "which we should be proud of, prove that the party's lines and policies are completely correct." In offering general guidance to party members and combatants the letter notes that they, "more than anyone else," must know how to "unite, organize, and lead the masses in arising to liberate themselves." And it adds that in order to fulfill this task they must "trust and rely" on the masses and also "thoroughly and realistically mobilize the masses."

In addition, in urging party and youth group members to constantly train and improve themselves so as to be worthy "pupils and heirs of President Ho's great enterprise," the party letter tells them to "thoroughly understand and correctly implement" the advice given by Ho to southern combatants and compatriots on 18 March 1968 :

Their will must be vigorous, their plan must be careful, their supervision must be thorough, their coordinated actions must be well-gearred, their execution must be very careful; cadres must set a good example, and secrets must be well-kept. These are key factors enabling them to satisfactorily fulfill their duties.*

The letter says that in his testament Ho had bequeathed to all party members, people and combatants--"especially to the south"--a confidence in victory and a "determination-to-fight-and-win" spirit. It prefaces a pledge to "hold high" President Ho's "determination-to-fight-and-win banner" with a call for high revolutionary ethics and the safeguarding of the party's "purity." And it concludes by offering condolences to the families of "comrades who have sacrificed their lives, who are in jail, or who have been wounded."

BACKGROUND ON PRP ORGANS

During 1964 and 1965 numerous PRP pronouncements were publicized.** For example, at least 14 articles, editorials, or messages attributed to PRP organs were publicized by Vietnamese communist media from mid-June 1964 to mid-August 1965.

* No such public statement of this date is known to have been previously publicized.

** Communist media treatment of the PRP from 1966-1969 is reviewed in FBIS Special Report "The PRG and the PRP in South Vietnam," 24 July 1969, pages 19-24, and the FBIS SURVEY of 15 September 1969, pages 1-4.

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During this period communist media referred to various periodicals as the party organ. For example, Liberation Radio on 22 June 1964 carried an editorial said to have appeared in the May 1964 issue of the journal TIEN PHONG, which the radio identified as the "political and ideological journal of the PRP." But the same radio on 3 October 1964 identified a monthly periodical, NHAN DAN, as the "political and ideological struggle organ" of the PRP. Selected items from this southern NHAN DAN were publicized by communist media for four consecutive months, from October 1964 until February 1965. There have been no known reports of articles from the southern NHAN DAN since that time.

A 22 July 1965 VNA report on life in South Vietnam's "liberated areas" noted that the "paper" NHAN DAN and the "magazine" TIEN PHONG, "organs of the South Vietnam People's Revolutionary Party, are widely circulated, having the effect of guiding and leading the movement." There is other evidence that at this point there may also have been a daily paper TIEN PHONG. For example, Hanoi Radio on 25 July 1965 broadcast what it called an editorial from TIEN PHONG's "15 July issue," while Liberation Radio on 20 August 1965 carried excerpts of what was described as TIEN PHONG's "19 August editorial."

The existence of a third PRP organ was indicated in a Hanoi VNA 29 April 1965 report of an editorial said to have appeared in the 24 April issue of CO GIAT PHONG, a southern paper that VNA identified as the "organ of the PRP in the urban areas of South Vietnam."

TOPICS IN BRIEF

SOVIET AID TO DRV

A brief Moscow news report on 22 January, repeated on the 28th, says there will be a 50 percent increase in cargo sent to the DRV from the Soviet Far East this year and that some 50,000 tons of food will be sent each month. Assertions of increases in cargo are not unusual, but Moscow is not known to have previously revealed such comprehensive figures on the amounts of any specific type of goods sent to the DRV. Reports occasionally note that an individual ship is carrying foodstuffs or flour to the DRV without specifying tonnage, or report the total tonnage carried by individual ships or a fleet without breaking down amounts of each type of cargo. Individual gifts of foodstuffs have occasionally been publicized. For example, on 18 March 1968, TASS cited an official of the USSR Ministry of Maritime Fleet as noting that "recently" 150,000 tons of flour were sent to Vietnam "as a gift from the Soviet people." On 16 April 1969 TASS reported that a Soviet women's delegation visiting the DRV brought gifts of 50 tons of sugar, 25 tons of rice, and 18 tons of powdered and condensed milk.

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Background: Typical examples of past references to increased cargo include the following items: On 20 March 1968 Moscow radio reported that the Soviet Far East shipping bureau shipped "twice as many" aid goods as during the corresponding quarter of 1967. A report on 7 October 1968 noted that shipments of industrial equipment and food from the Soviet Far East had "increased by one-half" for the first 8 months of the year compared to the corresponding period in 1967. A 4 May 1969 report said that during the past four months "1.5 times as many goods were shipped from Vladivostok" to the DRV as during the same period of 1968.

PRG DIPLOMATIC STATUS

A 10 February LPA roundup on the recent visits of joint NFLSV/PRG delegations to various countries of Africa and the Middle East notes that the group led by Nguyen Van Quang went to Mali.* This first available report that a group visited Mali makes no explicit mention of diplomatic relations. However, that such relations have probably been agreed upon seems indicated by the fact the LPA report claims that there are now 11 countries "in these regions" which have now established diplomatic relations with the PRG. Eleven noncommunist countries have recognized the PRG, and all are either African or Arab states except Cambodia. All but Mali have previously been reported as having received PRG ambassadors or as having agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level.

* See the 29 January 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages 4-7, for a review of the tours of several NFLSV/PRG delegations.

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THE FAR EAST

DPRK DENIES ORDERING BACTERIA, CHARGES U.S. PREPARES CBW

Allegations in ROK and Japanese media since the end of January that North Korea had ordered cholera and other bacteria from a Japanese firm are denied by Pyongyang in a commentary carried by KCNA and the domestic service on 5 February. The commentary calls the reports a "preposterous lie" and "malicious slander"; it says that the Japanese and South Koreans, at U.S. instigation, are trying to justify their own "frantic maneuvers" to provoke a war, "particularly their criminal schemes to use germ weapons more extensively, by circulating the barefaced lie that our country intends to manufacture germ weapons."

The commentary goes on to elaborate routinely on alleged U.S. preparations for the provocation of a new war in Korea as a way out from defeats in Vietnam and in the face of the "revolutionary advance" of the people in South Korea and in Asia as a whole. Asserting that the ROK and Japan are accomplices of the United States, it adds that Japan has offered its territory as "an arsenal, supply base, and a chemical and bacteriological weapon procurement base."

There is no other available Pyongyang reference to this episode, but prior to the first Japanese report of the alleged Pyongyang order, on 31 January, KCNA on the 27th had carried a NODONG SINMUN commentary scoring alleged U.S. preparations for "chemical and germ warfare," referring to a statement by "the commander of a base of the U.S. imperialist aggressor army in Alabama." (A similar commentary broadcast the next day by the "South Korea Liberation Radio"* says that the statement was made on 24 January and disclosed that ROK army troops were being brought to the United States for training in the use of "chemical and bacteriological weapons." The commentary says that this is a U.S. "machination to start a war of aggression in Korea and to turn it into a chemical

* This radio, first heard 31 March 1967, is a channel for encouragement of the South Korean "struggle" against the ROK Government. It does not announce its location, but technical clues link it to facilities used by the Pyongyang domestic service.

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and bacteriological war." The commentary explicitly charges the United States with using "germs" in the war in South Vietnam. The commentaries are apparently responsive to a 24 January Army statement that it is continuing to train foreign officers in CBW at Fort McClellan, Alabama, although the United States had recently decided to limit its use of such weapons.) The NODONG SINMUN commentary notes that "chemical and germ institutes and test grounds" have been set up in "various parts of the United States, Japan, West Germany, and the rest of the world where the U.S. imperialists set their foot." It **calls** President Nixon's statement that he "would not be the first" to use such weapons a "cunning trick" and recalls that the United States allegedly used "chemical and germ weapons" in the "war of aggression in Korea in the past and in South Vietnam at present."

On 9 and 10 February respectively KCNA carries MINJU CHOSON and NODONG SINMUN commentaries denouncing the United States for allegedly bringing "new poison gas weapons" to Okinawa and claiming that the United States stockpiles "chemical and germ weapons" in Okinawa and Japan. NODONG SINMUN says this is evidence of increased U.S. preparations for "criminal chemical and germ warfare against the Korean people and other Asian people."

Pyongyang rarely comments on the subject of bacteriological warfare, although on appropriate occasions, such as the 25 June anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, propaganda does recall charges that the United States used bacteriological weapons during that war. A 22 July 1969 KCNA commentary on the incident in which American servicemen were affected by nerve gas in Okinawa also recalled that charge. Pyongyang has commented before on U.S. production of CBW weapons. A 12 June 1968 domestic service commentary, for example, reported U.S. "tests" of such weapons in the Panama Canal Zone, Greenland, and U.S. territory.

DFRK CLIES SOUTHERNERS' HOPE FOR UNIFICATION BY KIM'S 60TH BIRTHDAY

In recent weeks Pyongyang propaganda has for the first time acknowledged reports of alleged assertions by South Koreans--which have recurred over the past several years--that the North Koreans hope to unify the country in time for Kim Il-song's 60th birthday. Since December Pyongyang has reported in at least three items statements allegedly made by individuals from South Korea expressing the expectation that the country will be unified in time for the birthday

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celebrations.* The DPRK is not known to have mentioned this target date on its own authority, and in its own comment, Pyongyang is invariably vague about the timing, calling for unification "at an early date," "without delay," or "within our generation." The latter phrase has been the favored one since the October 1966 KWP conference. Declarations that the Korean people should be prepared for the revolutionary struggle "whenever called upon by the party and the leader" have appeared from time to time since mid-1967.

The first statement on imminent unification was reported on 22 December 1969, when the PYONGYANG TIMES published a press conference with the pilot and copilot of the South Korean airliner which was diverted to North Korea on 11 December. The copilot is quoted as saying: "The South Korean people are fighting to bring as early as possible the day when the country will be unified and the brothers and sisters of the North and South will live in happiness, before the respected and beloved leader is 60 years old." On 17 January KCNA reports a meeting of some of the plane passengers with North Korean citizens in which the South Koreans are cited as saying that "there is the widespread rumor in South Korea today that the fatherland will be unified before the 60th birthday of Premier Kim Il-song" Again, on 23 January KCNA reports a Pyongyang city meeting to greet an ROK army soldier who defected to the North, quoting him as saying that "the South Korean people say with hope and pride that they will arrange in Seoul a grand feast celebrating the 60th birthday of Premier Kim Il-song after the country is unified."

* According to Kim's official biographers, he was born on 15 April, 1912. In April 1969 Pyongyang and the media of other countries published messages addressed to Kim congratulating him on his 57th birthday.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRO-SOVIET LINE DOMINATES FRENCH PARTY CONGRESS

The French Communist Party (PCF) has again demonstrated its subservience to Soviet tutelage by ousting maverick Roger Garaudy from the party Politburo and Central Committee for his "anti-Soviet" and "revisionist" views. The 19th PCF Congress, which met from 4 to 8 February, excluded Garaudy's name from the list of candidates elected to the party leadership but permitted him to retain his party membership. Although available reports of the congress* indicate that the PCF leadership--with an assist from a high-powered Soviet delegation led by Kirilenko and Ponomarev--managed to put up a united front against Garaudy and a facade of unity, it appears to have done so by suppressing discussion of issues which anti-Soviet intellectuals in the party wished to explore--the Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia and its implications for party autonomy and for the pursuit of differing roads to socialism.

Having expressed "disapproval" of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the French party has progressively muted its disagreement with the Soviets on this issue. The PCF Central Committee draft theses submitted to the congress--carried in the PCF organ L'HUMANITE on 15 November 1969--make only a brief reference to the August 1968 events, stating that the party's expression of "disagreement" following the intervention should not be allowed to stand in the way of "close cooperation with the CPSU." The party thus sought to paper over the 1968 position while letting it stand on the record; the PCF could not realistically have been expected to publicly repudiate its condemnation of the intervention, in effect embracing the limited sovereignty doctrine and endorsing the Soviet Union's right to interfere in another country's affairs, without seriously compromising its claim to independence and jeopardizing its negotiations for an antigovernment coalition with the French Socialist Party and other leftist groups.

* The texts of speeches by many of the foreign parties are not yet available.

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Moscow's reportage and comment on the congress suggests that the Soviets were well pleased with the proceedings. Soviet commentators evince gratification at Garaudy's removal from the PCF leadership, although they play down the Garaudy affair--with its embarrassing implications for the Soviet Union's own image as well as for that of the PCF--and focus on general approbation of the French communists. TASS notes that the Soviet Union was lavishly praised and that the Chinese leadership was formally condemned in the congress documents.

Garaudy Ouster Reflects Impact of Czechoslovak Issue

The impact of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia on West European communist intellectuals is underlined by the effect they apparently had on Roger Garaudy. A PCF Central Committee member since 1945, the party's leading theoretician, and director of its Marxist studies center in Paris, Garaudy for years was a model of ideological orthodoxy. He denounced the "anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary uprising" in Hungary in 1956 and played a major role in weeding out "revisionist" elements and writing them out of the French party. The Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia, he maintains in his book "The Great Turning Point of Socialism," became a catalyst leading to his reexamination of the nature of socialism and its future.

The central question raised by Garaudy, both in his book and in an article published in L'HUMANITE on 2 January of this year, emphasize the idea that it is not enough to "disapprove" of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia"; it is also "necessary to analyze the theoretical and political principles underlying it which implicate our party's entire policy and the French concept of socialism." In his view, he adds in L'HUMANITE, it is "absolutely necessary to say to the French people: the socialism which our party wants to instill in France is not that which is today imposed militarily on Czechoslovakia."

The PCF Politburo, clearly unwilling to publicly explore the implications of such cherished communist principles as democratic centralism and proletarian internationalism, denounced Garaudy in an 18 December communique published in L'HUMANITE, charging him with advocating anti-communist heresies and urging him to conform to the party's orthodox line.*

* For a discussion of the Politburo's indictment and Garaudy's rebuttal in L'HUMANITE, see the 15 January 1970 issue of the SURVEY, "French Communist Party Rebukes Anti-Soviet Intellectual," pages 15-20.

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MARCHAIS' INDICTMENT

PCF Secretary Marchais (later elected to the new post of Assistant Secretary General), standing in for the ailing First Secretary Waldeck Rochet, detailed the party's charges against Garaudy in delivering the Central Committee's report to the congress on 4 February. Although the report, carried in L'HUMANITE on the 5th was mainly concerned with internal French politics and with support of Soviet foreign policy goals, it provided the rationale for Garaudy's expulsion from the leadership by charging him with rapidly taking the road "from opportunism to liquidation of Marxism-Leninism." More specifically, it accused him of launching "diatribes" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and of taking a too sympathetic view of the Chinese Communist leadership. On the internal front, he was charged with trying to promote division within the party and of "contesting the role of the working class, substituting for it a would-be 'new historical bloc.'" In this connection, Marchais noted that during the 1968 student revolt Garaudy had sought to subordinate the PCF to workers' and student movements outside the party.

On the sensitive issue of Czechoslovakia, Marchais defensively pointed out that the party had "expressed quite frankly its disagreement with the 21 August military intervention in Czechoslovakia." He was quick to add, however, that since then the party "has shown its understanding of the efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the crisis" and to warn that the party is "determined to fight uncompromisingly any show of anti-Sovietism, whatever its origin."

According to available accounts of the congress, other PCF members paraded to the rostrum to denounce Garaudy as a provocateur who was working against the interests of the French workers. A Paris dated dispatch from the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG on the 7th noted that up to that time no one had come forward to defend Garaudy's views. AFP reported on the same day that 130 speakers had addressed the congress and that "no discordant notes were raised," adding that the French party was believed to have asked the head of the Italian delegation to delete any references to Czechoslovakia from his speech.

GARAUDY'S REBUTTAL

An unrepentant Garaudy's rebuttal to the congress on 6 February was largely obscured in L'HUMANITE's brief account of his address on the 7th. According to AFP and LE MONDE, Garaudy rejected allegations that he is guilty of "anti-Sovietism" and reasserted his

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central thesis that the PCF must disavow the model of socialism that has been imposed militarily on Czechoslovakia. If the party is going to achieve its goal of unity with the noncommunist left and by implication sell its "advanced democracy" to the French people, he argued, it must make clear what type of socialism it intends to build in France and how its model will differ from existing socialist regimes. The principle of democratic centralism, he asserted, would have to be modified and the party would have to broaden its definition of "the working class" to include a growing number of intellectuals who are becoming an increasingly important factor in the age of science and technology.

Rejecting the allegation that his views are "anti-Soviet," Garaudy reportedly argued that what feeds anticommunism are acts which violate communist principles and not the open discussion of such acts. He maintained that proletarian internationalism is violated when a socialist country, in the midst of a miner's strike in Asturias, sends Franco the coal which helps him to break the strike, and when a socialist country, after having divided the Greek party of Manolis Glezos, builds electrical installations for the Greek fascists.* Acknowledging that this was probably his farewell address, Garaudy concluded that although the party could get rid of the dissidents, it could not eliminate the realities that nourished them and that such problems will ultimately force it to modify its methods and policies.

The sanitized L'HUMANITE version sarcastically reported that Garaudy failed to respond to the arguments advanced against him at the congress. It took note of his denial that he was guilty of anti-Sovietism and his remark on the need to discuss such issues as Czechoslovakia, while obscuring his attack on instances of violation of proletarian internationalism: "After having launched a gross attack against several socialist countries, he concluded and left the hall amidst total silence."

* Garaudy's reference to coal shipments to Spain appears to be directed at the Polish party. A recent Spanish CP Executive Committee statement, broadcast by the clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 18 January, called upon Poland to refuse to sell the Franco regime coal that would be used to offset a shortage resulting from the strike of Asturian miners. The same statement expressed surprise over Western press reports of a late-December Moscow airport meeting between the Spanish Foreign Minister and senior Soviet officials. (See the FBIS TRENDS of 21 January, page 25.) Garaudy's mention of "electrical installations" for the Greeks apparently alludes to a Soviet-built power plant; Athens radio in early December had reported the Soviet ambassador's presence at the cornerstone ceremony for the plant.

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In a 28 January interview published in Turin's LA STAMPA, Garaudy had predicted that he would be removed from the party Politburo and Central Committee and charged that the congress was rigged against him. From the moment the charges against him appeared in L'HUMANITE, he said, those who supported his views "were systematically removed from the pre-congress conferences on all levels," which guaranteed that there would be "no discussion of any kind at the congress." Although Garaudy conceded that he was not supported by a majority, he observed that "there is a strong current in the party which thinks as I do; and it will not be represented at the congress."

Moscow Hails Congress as Victory for Communist Unity

Soviet comment hails the French congress as another victory for communist unity. A TASS report on 9 February noted approvingly that the party theses praised the Soviet Union "as the major force of the world socialist system" and "condemned the leaders of the CCP who dissociated themselves from scientific socialism." TASS also reported that many speakers condemned "the rightist opportunist viewpoints of Roger Garaudy," who was also accused of "dissociating himself from Marxism-Leninism."

Soviet delegation chief Kirilenko, apparently having been assured that Garaudy was on his way out of the PCF leadership, in his address to the delegates on 5 February expressed "high appreciation for the resolute rebuff" the French Party was giving "to all manifestations of anti-Sovietism," but did not name Garaudy. And Soviet comment on the congress has mentioned the Garaudy affair only briefly and in low key, evidently motivated by concern not to seem to be interfering in the PCF's affairs and not to embarrass the French party while its efforts to promote a left coalition are in progress. The dominant line in the comment is a portrayal of the French party as a champion of "peace, democracy, and socialism," in keeping with the CPSU message to the congress. While briefly characterizing the PCF as a "profoundly internationalist party," the message emphasized that "it indefatigably defends its people's national interests and actively fights for an independent foreign policy for France."

The Soviet downplaying of the Garaudy affair now that his ouster from the leadership has been accomplished contrasts with a violent personal attack on him in the 15 January PRAVDA, while preparations

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for the congress were under way. The article apparently caused the PCF some embarrassment: widely publicized in noncommunist French media, it was ignored entirely in the PCF's L'HUMANITE. In the Italian LA STAMPA interview, Garaudy denounced it as "intolerable intervention in the PCF's internal affairs" and added that the Soviets "are unfortunately accustomed to such things. To them, 'normalization' did not stop in Czechoslovakia."*

* See page 21 of the 15 January SURVEY for a discussion of the PRAVDA article.

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EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

HUNGARIAN DEBATE OVER GUEVARA UNDERLINES PROBLEM OF ULTRALEFT

The airing by the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG in January of a sharp debate on the revolutionary role of Che Guevara underscores both the persistence in Hungarian media of an element of Czechoslovak-style candor and the problem posed by ultraleftist movements to the orthodox communist establishment.

The growing scope of the problem was indicated in speeches at the 19-23 January Moscow conference on Leninism and anticommunism by Demichev, who scored "incoherencies and hysterical cries about mankind as a whole," and by Ponomarev, who identified anticommunism not only with the rightwing but also with "various leftwing, ultrarevolutionary and pseudorevolutionary groups such as Trotskyites, the Maoists, and their like." A statement on this conference in the 9 February issue of Warsaw's ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSC by Werblan, head of the Polish party's science and education department, stressed that the tendencies of Maoist-style "leftist opportunism also make their impact on the so-called protest movements of young people," and these "reckless tendencies compromise socialist ideas, repulse the masses from these ideas, and favor anticommunism." In Czechoslovakia, Prague media on 12 January identified for the first time a leftwing "Trotskyite conspiracy" in the country and retroactively assigned it a major role in the August 1969 student riots on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion.

Orthodox Critic Says Radical Left May "Gain More Ground"

Writing in the 10 January issue of NEPSZABADSAG, orthodox communist critic Ratis Hajdu examined the implications of the appearance of a poem in praise of Guevara by a leftist writer, Miklos Haraszti, in the December issue of the independent literary monthly UJ IRAS (New Writing). The poem, entitled "Che's Errors," used the satirical device of ostensibly criticizing the fallen revolutionary from orthodox Marxist standpoint, calling him "an irresponsible adventurer" and pointing to his lack of knowledge of leadership, failure to gain "popularity," demand for "many Vietnams," scorn of material incentives, lack of knowledge of humanism, and denial of peaceful transition: "And he was a hypocrite, because he lacked faith/ even in the strength of his own ideals/ he claimed there would be no,/ in fact, wasn't any revolution where no one was waging one"

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Hajdu said of Haraszti's poem, in his 10 January NEPSZABADSAG criticism, that "in this instance the problematic nature of his poetry goes beyond the individual case and draws attention to the spiritual and moral attitude which is stylish in some--not too large--circles of our young intelligentsia and which, as certain symptoms indicate, seems to be able to gain more ground." Under the title "Revolution or Anarchy", Hajdu reflected the plight of conservatism in Hungary and elsewhere in the socialist world in remarking defensively that anyone who today defends communist positions in artistic debates is given "the epithet of sectarian, conservative, and dogmatic, or of a philistine, petit or other bourgeois." He cited in this connection "a recent Budapest joke--that it is easy to be a communist in the West nowadays, but try it in our country!"

Hajdu went on to stress the broader aspects of the problem in noting that "during the past few years a certain, not too significant, part of our young intelligentsia has forcefully 'radicalized' itself," bringing about a revival "in a different form" of the leftist communist "infantile disorder" which Lenin had denounced. This radical element demanded "boundless democracy" and "revolutionary asceticism," as brought out in the poem's tribute to Guevara's rejection of material incentives. Hajdu argued that the concept of boundless democracy was incompatible with Hungary's "socialist democracy," which "expresses class interests"--those of the workers and peasants. Recalling the "bitter" experience of Hungary's "age of asceticism" (the 1956 revolt), he concluded with a warning to the ultraleftists that "they should be afraid of an attitude which pleads for revolution, be it reasonable or not, and which, disregarding realities, can only end in tragedy."

The debate was continued and, for the present at least, concluded in the 24 January NEPSZABADSAG, which published letters by Haraszti and Hajdu side by side under the heading "A Poem and Its Evaluation." The party paper explained its further airing of the controversy in a low-keyed editorial note on "the partly impatient and passionate dispute between a young poet and a young critic--they are about the same age--which, however, goes beyond personal problems and touches upon essential aspects of the revolutionary nature of our youth." In fact, the letters generally lowered the debate to the level of personalities, rather than shedding much new light on the substance of the controversy: Haraszti's "Answer to Rafis Hajdu" attacked the critic for "replacing concrete esthetic analysis with phrases taken from everyday politics"--"without even quoting one line from my poem." It also took Hajdu to task for attributing to the poet

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"such self-styled notions as 'boundless democracy' and 'revolutionary asceticism'" and for "carefully dodging the main question of whether he himself thinks Che was a Marxist."

Hajdu's "Rejoinder" obligingly included quotations from Haraszti's "attempt at writing poetry" and took exception to Haraszti's identification of student movements with Guevara's "isolation" and theory of "spontaneous" revolution. "We must proceed," Hajdu said, "together with the really revolutionary part of the student movements, try to convince those inclining toward adventurism with a romantic attitude, and isolate the ill-intentioned and harmful elements."

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THE USSR

PRAVDA ARTICLE ATTACKS VORONOV'S ORENBURG CONSTITUENCY

Orenburg oblast--an area that during the 1968-69 period received more praise than any other for its agricultural successes--has now been severely criticized. A recent PRAVDA article (28 January) calls into question its high reputation and criticizes its present leaders by name. The oblast has been associated with RSFSR Premier Voronov, who was obkom first secretary during the 1957-61 period, and during 1969 it was extensively praised by Voronov's subordinates for successful implementation of livestock-raising and farming methods originally introduced in Orenburg by Voronov.

Although Voronov's protege V. A. Shurygin was purged as obkom first secretary in early 1964, officials who served under Voronov and Shurygin still hold important positions in Orenburg. They include obkom secretaries V. V. Kiselev and M. S. Khromova and executive committee chairman A. N. Balandin.

The attack on Orenburg coincides with a general upsurge of press criticism since the December 1969 Central Committee plenum. The sharpest recent criticisms have been directed at the Voronezh obkom bureau and the Tomsk oblast executive committee, in SOVIET RUSSIA editorials on 3 and 4 February. Unlike Orenburg, however, both of these areas had been lagging in agricultural production and, in line with the current campaign, were basically criticized for allowing violations of party and state discipline and nonfulfillment of economic plans. The apparent absence of such serious deficiencies as a basis for criticism in Orenburg suggests that the attack is motivated by purely partisan considerations.

Orenburg Leaders Accused of Suppression of Criticism

Noting that "the drums have been beaten very often lately" about Orenburg's successes, the PRAVDA article by correspondents A. Blatin and A. Merkulov assails the Orenburgers for a wide range of failings, even including shortcomings in their highly touted livestock raising. Responsibility is placed squarely on the obkom leaders, who are criticized for complacency, evasion, and suppression of local criticism.

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The article also condemns the Orenburg obkom leaders for ignoring or only "formally" reacting to criticism in the central press. The authors cite a number of critical PRAVDA articles exposing such minor shortcomings as pollution by Orenburg enterprises, slow construction of grain warehouses, losses of grain during the harvest, and poor preparations for sowing millet.

Much more damaging are the article's revelations of the extensive behind-the-scenes exchanges between the Orenburg leaders and Moscow, especially PRAVDA and the Party Control Committee. About half the article is devoted to the "many sharp and important letters" of complaint received by PRAVDA from Orenburg and the Orenburg leaders' improper responses to these complaints. One complaint was reportedly dismissed by obkom secretary V.V. Kiselev as unfounded, but upon the instructions of the Party Control Committee in Moscow the obkom had to reinvestigate the matter, and on 10 November 1969 obkom secretary N.I. Vostrikov reported to Moscow that the complaint was correct. Some obkom leaders were also accused of "direct suppression of criticism and persecution in response" to criticism, and covering up such behavior was characterized as "quite widespread" in Orenburg. Obkom first secretary A.V. Kovalenko himself was criticized for cooperating in wrongly condemning a critic and then having to write a letter to Moscow reversing his position. The authors sum up by demanding that the obkom change its attitude toward press criticism and critical letters.

Orenburg Lauded as Example for Agricultural Successes

The PRAVDA attack represents a sharp reversal in press treatment of Orenburg. After failing to fulfill the grain plan in 1967 (RURAL LIFE, 20 January 1968), Orenburg gathered an unprecedented harvest in 1968. On 27 October 1968 (SOVIET RUSSIA) RSFSR First Deputy Premier Pysin announced that Orenburg had delivered more grain to the state than any oblast or kray ever had before. The press was filled with praise for Orenburg, and Brezhnev singled out Orenburg's "big successes" at the October 1968 Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 31 October 1968). The oblast was awarded an Order of Lenin (PRAVDA, 29 October 1968).

A second round of press buildup occurred in mid-1969, when the RSFSR Council of Ministers opened a campaign for specialized meat cattle farms patterned after Orenburg's experience. Orenburg's methods--which produced meat cattle of record weight and boosted beef deliveries by 46 percent over 1968--were praised by RSFSR agricultural officials, and an RSFSR seminar was held in Orenburg

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to study Orenburg methods (SOVIET RUSSIA, 4 July, 8 July, 3 August, and 5 October; RURAL LIFE, 25 July; ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 28, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, No. 7). The methods used had been introduced by Voronov during his 1957-1961 tenure as obkom first secretary and were proposed for national application by him at the January 1961 Central Committee plenum, but were rejected by Khrushchev.

Another round of praise for Orenburg occurred in October 1969, when the oblast was favorably cited for its especially early completion of fall plowing--another practice insisted upon by Voronov when he became obkom first secretary in 1957 (3 October 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA editorial, 6 October PRAVDA editorial, and 10 October TRUD interview with Orenburg officials).

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COMMUNIST CHINA

PARTY COMMITTEES FORMED AT COUNTY AND CITY LEVELS

The campaign to rebuild the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a disciplined organizational structure appears to be gaining momentum, with the propaganda indicating some progress in rebuilding CCP committees at the county and city level.

On 9 February Harbin claimed the formation of Heilungkiang's first county CCP committee--for Hulin county, which includes the Chenpao island area. As in the prior example of the first new county CCP committee in Hunan province, announced on 2 December by Changsha radio, Peking has not publicized the new committee.

Party building in Hulin appears to have been a painstaking process of first reconstructing, under the direction of the county's leading core, all basic party units at the county, commune, and brigade level within Hulin and then, two months ago, selecting delegates to "the fourth congress of the CCP in Hulin county." The congress "conducted an election by secret ballot, and formed the Hulin county CCP committee on 2 February." The effort appears to have been directed by the district CCP core group and the Heilungkiang provincial CCP core group, both represented at the county congress.

The exact membership of the new committee was not revealed, but the broadcast did claim that pre-Cultural Revolution members and those who emerged during the Cultural Revolution, as well as PLA members, were elected to the committee. Earlier reports from other provinces on rebuilt lower-level party units have not specifically indicated that PLA members hold positions within the new party structures.

On 1 February Canton reported that a municipal CCP committee had been established in Maoming, a lesser Kwangtung city, but nonetheless the first new city party committee reported in the nation. Party rebuilding efforts in Kwangtung were given an extra push on 1 February when NCNA, in an unusual move, publicized the activities of the CCP core group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee in organizing party members and activists, who asked to join the CCP, to study the new party constitution. This is the first known reference in official central media since 1967 to a party core group at the provincial level. Provincial-level CCP core groups for Inner Mongolia, Shantung, and Heilungkiang, recently mentioned in local broadcasts, have not been publicized by Peking.

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Kwangtung's sudden emergence as a leader in the CCP reconstruction movement is surprising in light of the fact that no new party branches or committees had previously been publicized by Canton radio. Hunan and Heilungkiang, for example, reported a meticulous process of building the party progressively branch by branch prior to formation of their first county committees. Possibly some "longstanding problems" have been recently resolved in Kwangtung, and their resolution is being reflected in the current evidence of party reconstruction as well as in an indication that Ting Sheng may have been named commander of the Canton Military Region. Ting, formerly deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military Region who was transferred to Kwangtung nearly two years ago, was listed in the position normally reserved for the regional commander in a 1 February Canton radio report on a local rally.

RED FLAG SETS FORTH GUIDELINES FOR CHINA'S ECONOMY

With several articles in RED FLAG No. 2 providing the impetus, CPR media have launched a broad, two-pronged campaign on economic issues. One aspect is a relatively moderate economic program calling for rational economic development--but in a context of war preparedness precluding the predominance of strictly economic viewpoints. The second aspect consists of a harsh denunciation of economic speculation and corruption, exposed as a serious, continuing problem. The general trend of the planning as explicated in articles in RED FLAG and other publications is for a great leap forward, but a leap that will avoid the previous error of ignoring economic realities and one that will be effectively managed by the center, albeit with considerable local autonomy.

The theoretical basis for the development of the economy is laid out in a RED FLAG article by the Kirin Provincial Revolutionary Committee attacking Sun Yeh-fang, former director of the Economic Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Sun was severely criticized at the beginning of the cultural revolution in much the same terms. Setting up Sun's theories as negative examples, the article seems to opt for an economy built on revolutionary fervor rather than profit, scoring Sun's view that the economy must be "run with economic methods." But by taking as Sun's views the extreme limits of some of his teachings, the article actually allows considerable room for a rational system of economic planning and control.

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The aspect of Sun's theories most energetically attacked by RED FLAG is that planning should be done on the basis of maximum profit. The article ridicules Sun by pointing out that national defense industries are not profitable--an unusual acknowledgment--and that spreading plants throughout the country in preparation for war does not conform to the law of value. While Sun presumably would have made some allowances for national defense, there is little doubt that he did advocate using maximum profit as a tool for establishing priorities in economic planning, a use which the article also admits is legitimate: "We use the law of value as a tool in planning work and economic accounting. But we resolutely oppose making the law of value the basis for regulating production and for mapping out a plan." The point of departure between Sun Yeh-fang and current policies thus emerges as one of degree on this point, and the issue turns into a political question of juggling priority needs.

The problem of managing enterprises scattered throughout the country for strategic reasons is another aspect of the criticism of Sun which indirectly reveals the economic problems posed by the current stress on political and military necessity. The recent revival of the thesis advanced in early 1959 by Ko Ching-shih--that planning for the whole country must be treated as a coordinated chessgame--seems to represent an answer to this problem and is apparently utilized by RED FLAG for the purpose of reaffirming the necessity for central control of production units. Making a near-180 degree turn from many earlier indications of local unit control over enterprise management and planning, the RED FLAG article points out that enterprises under the ownership of the whole people have only one owner, "the state of the proletarian dictatorship." While the "delegation of lesser authority" is an integral part of the state system, powers apparently reserved for the center include "deciding the enterprises' orientation for development, deciding the products and the distribution of production, and deciding the management of the capital of enterprises."

Going to the core of Ko Ching-shih's chessboard thesis--designed for the protection of Shanghai industry--the article warns that "using the planned materials and funds to undertake capital construction not included in the plan" would be anarchism. This appears to be a reminder to localities that what is good for the part is not necessarily good for the whole; small, local industries not included in state plans are not allowed to draw off materials needed by units included in state plan quotas.

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Forces of Capitalism in the Countryside Said Still Strong

Another RED FLAG article, this one by the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee on the role of agricultural development in China, is devoted in large part to the notion that victory is not yet won over capitalism and revisionism. It points out that after liberation land reform was not enough and capitalistic trends reappeared; the same possibility is indicated for today. Measures advocated to combat this danger amount in effect to a defense of the status quo as regards land ownership and labor management, while seeking leap-forward gains through basically material means--although, as always, under the aegis of Mao's thought.

Fuzzing over the retreat from the commune system to ownership by the production team in the aftermath of the leap-forward disasters, the article states that "the existing three-level ownership system and the people's commune system with production teams as the basis are basically suitable to the level of development of our productive forces; today it is imperative to adhere to and further improve this system." The "ownership by the whole people" thesis, virtually unmentioned in the past few years, is revived in the article as an eventual goal, of which the commune's "three-level ownership system was an initial manifestation." But the article gives no indication that the system is to change in the near future; it quotes Mao to the effect that "step-by-step" advance is best in order to lessen the peasant's fear of "abrupt change."

Concrete economic measures advocated by the article reaffirm the impression of moderation. In production the quotas of the "national unified economic plan" are to serve as the basic goals, with localities allowed some flexibility in quotas "on the precondition of observing the national unified plan and policies and laws." This formulation may indicate that harvests exceeding the national goals, and thus not counted on by the state, will be allowed to remain within the locality. In this connection the article replays the standard injunction that the interests of the state and the collective come before the individual, while simultaneously sounding a more unusual note: "We must also prevent storing up too much grain so as not to affect the commune member's income in a particular harvest year."

Using the theoretical framework devised in the immediate post-Liberation period--cooperation with the poor and lower-middle peasants and winning over the upper middle peasants--RED FLAG acknowledges that serious ideological problems persist in the countryside. The article tries to assign blame for this phenomenon to the rich peasants and the

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remnants of class enemies left in the countryside. But the desire of peasants for individual ownership shows through remarkably clearly, ranging from an old Mao quote which only claims that "the rural semiproletariat are less stubborn in their adherence to the system of small peasant ownership" than the middle peasants, to the acknowledgment that even today class enemies can "instigate a small number of well-to-do peasants to abandon agriculture and engage in commerce or to engage in sideline production and go it alone." Current problems in "some" communes are said to include political sabotage, speculation, and embezzlement. "Old ideas" are being used by class enemies to corrupt poor and lower-middle peasants, including clan relationships that undermine class relationships, the entertaining of guests who then feel an obligation, and direct bribes.

Provinces Amplify Corruption Charges, Fukien Reports Trial

Several provinces have begun to amplify the remarks in RED FLAG on current dangers in the struggle in the countryside. Fukien broadcasts from 3 to 8 February included an account of a mass trial and a warning to the chief criminals "belonging to cliques engaged in corruption" and those who have committed serious crimes and refuse to confess that they will be "arrested, sentenced, and executed according to the merits of their cases." The implication of organized crime in referring to criminal cliques is most unusual, but it may be intended as a cover for action against some "revolutionary" political groups. The launching of a general anticorruption campaign at the same time as a production campaign is certainly not fortuitous and does not necessarily indicate any sudden increment in economic crimes.

The Fukien campaign was launched on 3 February with a FUKIEN DAILY editorial calling for "seizing back that portion of the financial power which has been usurped and is still held by bad elements." Criminals were warned to confess immediately or "be dealt with severely by the dictatorship of the proletariat. The charges leveled at "criminal" elements have been couched in general terms, again indicating the political nature of the campaign, although certain trends such as "back-door sales and purchases of merchandise" were singled out.

On 8 February Foochow radio announced belatedly that on 6 January the "responsible department" of the Amoy revolutionary committee had held a trial rally of 14 "counterrevolutionaries" and "persons guilty of corruption, theft and speculation." It was noted that "bourgeois, evil, sinister winds have sprung up, again making themselves felt in the streets"--suggesting that mass action by disaffected revolutionary groups may have been involved.

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Other provinces indicate similar problems with continued corruption and violence. Chengchow radio on 9 February claimed that enemies were still buying "important state materials" through the back door in order to make "fantastic" profits. Taiyuan radio on 4 February claimed that active economic sabotage was continuing and noted an incident in which a landlord element committed arson at a warehouse. And, with no direct link to economic activities, a Shanghai WEN HUI PAO article on 4 February extended the ongoing cultural struggle in Shanghai to include the charge that in "certain places" the struggles with the counterrevolutionaries "are being carried out violently."

Several Provinces Discuss Their Agricultural Plans

Several provinces have recently held meetings to discuss agricultural plans and programs. Chekiang, which recently indicated that it has surpassed national agricultural program goals in grain production, on 4 February set up a new model for localities in Chiente county. The county has set goals to surpass not only the national development program goal of 800 catties of grain per mou, but also the current national plan and the area's previous record output. Units were told to strive for an output of 1,000 catties per mou in 1970, though this was not actually set as a quota; it had previously been mentioned as a provincial goal for the next three to five years. The "three surpass" movement is being linked with the "two breakthroughs" movement, previously confined to Kiangsi province, which calls for concentrated labor effort against limited, specific targets.

Changsha radio on 4 February announced that a provincial three-year plan now in operation would produce a leap forward in the 1970-72 period. Local plans down to the county and enterprise level were said to have been formulated. Echoing the Honan committee's article in RED FLAG, the broadcast called for the leadership at all levels to get rid of "rightist conservative ideas" and oppose departmentalism by taking "the whole country as one chessboard" and "the whole province as one chessboard." This latter call for provincial coordination is not a part of the traditional chessboard thesis, although it fits in with current ideas of local economic systems for national defense purposes. Stress on the province as a coordinated unit could in fact negate the idea of national coordination.

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POSSIBLE NEW CATEGORY OF PLA SERVICE NOTED IN PROVINCES

In connection with the annual spring festival campaign to "support the army," several provincial radios--including Anhwei, Shantung, Kirin, Chekiang, and Kiangsi--have noted that among those entitled to comfort and aid are "those who have been transferred to civilian work from active service." This category is added to the usual listing of soldiers, army dependents, disabled and retired soldiers, and demobilized soldiers, and may indicate a new category of army reservist, under more direct PLA command than the militia.

There has been a recent upsurge in media mention of the role of former servicemen in war preparations, including a 24 January Canton radio reference to former servicemen who pledged that even though they had left the army they "would not give up their rifles." The same radio on 6 February mentioned that about half of the local former servicemen held posts as basic cadres and took part in directing militia activities.

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